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Abstract: We argue that there is a conflict among classical theism’s commitments
to divine simplicity, divine creative freedom, and omniscience. We start by defining
key terms for the debate related to classical theism. Then we articulate a new
argument, the Aloneness Argument, aiming to establish a conflict among these
attributes. In broad outline, the argument proceeds as follows. Under classical
theism, it’s possible that God exists without anything apart from Him. Any
knowledge God has in such a world would be wholly intrinsic. But there are
contingent truths in every world, including the world in which God exists alone. So,
it’s possible that God (given His omniscience) contingently has wholly intrinsic
knowledge. But whatever is contingent and wholly intrinsic is an accident. So, God
possibly has an accident. This is incompatible with classical theism. Finally, we
consider and rebut several objections.
Introduction
Classical theism is a model of God that affirms certain unique divine attri-
butes such as timelessness, immutability, simplicity, impassibility, freedom,
omniscience, and omnipotence. The focus of our article is a conflict among
three such attributes: simplicity, freedom, and omniscience. We begin by
defining these terms, after which we provide both an informal and formal presen-
tation of what we call the Aloneness Argument. Finally, we consider and rebut five
objections.




Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Purdue University Libraries, on 27 Jan 2021 at 14:45:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Let’s turn, then, to definitions of the divine attributes at play. We begin with
divine simplicity as defined by proponents of classical theism.
Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS): There is no metaphysical or physical
composition in God, such that: (i) there is no distinction in God between
substance/attribute, essence/existence, form/matter, act/potency, genus/
differentia, agent/action, and essence/accident; and (ii) all of God’s
intrinsic features are identical not only to each other but to God Himself.
A little unpacking is required. First, the classical theistic tradition affirms that
genus, differentia, forms, properties, accidents, essence, and existence are all
metaphysical parts. Classical theists therefore deny that the simple God has any
of this metaphysical complexity. On this understanding, anything intrinsic to
but distinct from S is part of S.
Also central to our investigation are the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic fea-
tures. We use ‘feature’ as a generic term covering any positive ontological item
(e.g. properties, attributes, tropes, modes, states, actions, accidents, forms,
matter, acts of existence, essences, etc.). Now, a proper analysis of ‘intrinsic’ and
‘extrinsic’ is notoriously elusive. We can, however, offer a rough sketch. Intrinsic
features characterize things ‘in virtue of the way they themselves are’, whereas
extrinsic features characterize things ‘in virtue of their relations’ to other things
(Lewis (), ). Intrinsic predications of S are true solely in virtue of how S is
in itself. Extrinsic predications of S are true at least in part in virtue of something
outside S to which S relationally stands. Intrinsic features are either essential to
their bearers (e.g. Socrates’ humanity) or non-essential (e.g. Socrates’ stubby-
nosed-ness). Following standard contemporary usage of the term, the latter refer
to accidents – intrinsic features of S that are only contingently possessed by S. In
other words, we use ‘accident of S’ to refer to intrinsic features of S that S can
exist without. Proponents of divine simplicity explicitly deny that God has any acci-
dental features in this sense. For if God had intrinsic features merely contingently,
then (per DDS) God would be contingent, since God is identical to his intrinsic fea-
tures. Thus, classical theism requires that accidents – as we have defined them
above – cannot accrue to God.
We distinguish, further, between wholly extrinsic features and partly extrinsic
features. Roughly, S has F wholly extrinsically provided that the proposition ‘S
has F’ is true solely in virtue of something outside S. S has F partly extrinsically pro-
vided that the proposition ‘S has F’ is true partly in virtue of something outside S
and partly in virtue of S itself.
Another aspect of classical theism that plays a central role in our argument is
God’s creative freedom in actualizing the world. Following the lead of proponents
of divine simplicity, we characterize this as follows.
Divine Creative Freedom: God is free to create or not create the non-God
world, where the non-God world is anything with positive ontological status
distinct from God.
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Finally, we also rely on classical theism’s commitment to God’s omniscience.
Divine Omniscience: Necessarily, God knows everything that exists, obtains,
and is true.
Now, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to give an exhaustive and fully
detailed characterization of other classical theistic commitments such as timeless-
ness, immutability, and impassibility (and others have offered detailed analyses
elsewhere). Nevertheless, we’ve given a faithful and sufficiently precise character-
ization for the purposes of our argument. In the next section, we set the stage for
the Aloneness Argument.
Aloneness of God and contingency of creation
Classical theism affirms that God could have been alone. Classical theism
not only says that it is possible that God exist alone, but that there is in fact a
state of affairs wherein God exists alone, ontologically prior to creation. As
Brian Leftow explains, ‘before all else existed, God existed, alone, or God and
only God did not begin to exist’ (Leftow (), ). For our purposes, we highlight
the classical theistic claim that there’s some possible world wherein God is the
only thing in reality. Indeed, this follows straightforwardly from Divine Creative
Freedom. If God is free to create or not create the non-God world, then God
could have existed alone –without any non-God thing whatsoever.
One might worry that this only follows if there aren’t necessarily existent, uncre-
ated, Platonic abstracta. But Platonism is not compatible with classical theism.
Classical theism demands that anything apart from God has its being sourced in
God. The existence of any non-God thing presupposes God’s creation of said
thing. As Gaven Kerr emphasizes, for Aquinas and the classical theistic tradition
at large, God ‘is the unique subsisting source of being from which all existing
things come’ (Kerr (), ), and creation is understood with ‘God as primary
source of all things without Whose creative activity there would be nothing’
(ibid., ). Classical theism, then, is explicit that anything distinct from God
requires its being to be sourced in God’s creative activity.
So, since there being anything apart from God presupposes God’s creative activ-
ity, and since God is perfectly free to refrain from creating, it follows that there’s a
possible world wherein God exists alone. Call any world in which God exists alone
(i.e. a world in which God freely and providentially chooses not to create) an ‘alone
world’. So, classical theism entails an alone world is a possible world. Let’s call this
commitment of classical theism the Aloneness of God. As we shall see, the
Aloneness of God undergirds a new argument against classical theism.
Aloneness of God: Possibly, God exists without a non-God world.
The Aloneness of God also entails that the creation of the non-God world is con-
tingent. Call this the Contingency of Creation.
The aloneness argument against classical theism
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Contingency of Creation: There is a possible world in which God exists
alone, and there are possible worlds in which God exists with a world of
non-God things.
We follow the standard understanding of ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ in our inves-
tigation. Something is contingent if and only if it exists (obtains, is true) in some
possible worlds but not others. It could have failed to exist. Something is neces-
sary if and only if it exists (obtains, is true) in all possible worlds. It could not have
failed to exist. As applied to things that are not metaphysically impossible, these
two metaphysical categories are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive.
We also stress that suppositional necessity/possibility/impossibility do not
threaten our argument. Even if creation is suppositionally necessary, this only
means that creation necessarily follows from (i.e. is entailed by) some prior condi-
tion. But classical theists are explicit that this prior condition is contingent: it is
God’s free choice to create – a choice which He genuinely could have refrained
from making. And had God so refrained, God would have existed alone.
Therefore, God could have existed alone, even if creation is suppositionally neces-
sary. So, the appeal to suppositional necessity does not avoid the Aloneness of God
and, consequently, will not avoid our Aloneness Argument.
Now, the Aloneness of God and Contingency of Creation straightforwardly entail
that for each world, there is some contingent truth in that world. This is because for
any possible world that you pick, there will be a contingent truth concerning (say)
whether God created non-God things. There will also be a contingent truth con-
cerning whether God exists alone. In a world in which God exists alone, it is a con-
tingent truth that God exists alone. It is also a contingent truth in such a world that
God freely and providentially chose to refrain from creating. Therefore, according
to classical theism, in each possible world there is some contingent truth or other.
In other words: necessarily, there is some contingent truth or other. This raises
questions about God’s knowledge that we address in the next section.
Intrinsic divine knowledge
Thus far we have established classical theism’s commitment to the
Aloneness of God, the Contingency of Creation, and the fact that necessarily,
there is some contingent truth or other. In this section, we focus on divine knowl-
edge. This will help us reveal an inconsistency among omniscience, simplicity, and
creative freedom.
For our purposes at this stage, we leave open the precise way in which God has
knowledge. Some models understand it as intrinsic, others as (partly or wholly)
extrinsic. We only need the uncontroversial claim that God has knowledge.
Now, on classical theism, some of God’s knowledge is such that God necessarily
possesses it. But some of God’s knowledge is such that God contingently possesses
it. For example, God contingently knows that Earth exists. Since knowledge of x
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logically entails x, it follows (by the Distribution Axiom) that if God necessarily
knows the Earth exists, then the Earth necessarily exists. But the Earth does not
necessarily exist. So, God contingently knows the Earth exists.
Let’s consider, next, whether God’s knowledge is intrinsic, extrinsic, or a mixture
of both. We argue that in the alone world God’s knowledge is intrinsic. Historically,
classical theists have largely affirmed that God’s knowledge is intrinsic to (and in
fact identical to) God. Most non-classical theists also affirm that God’s knowl-
edge is intrinsic to God, though they deny that God’s knowledge is identical to
God (as they deny DDS). Interestingly, some contemporary proponents of classical
theism have argued that God’s knowledge is extrinsic. Grant () adopts an
extrinsic model of divine knowledge because if divine knowledge were intrinsic
to God, then there would be something contingent that is intrinsic to God. This
is because God is omniscient and only contingently knows contingent truths.
Thus, if divine knowledge were intrinsic to God, then there would be something
contingent and intrinsic to God. But that is impossible under classical theism,
since anything intrinsic to God is identical to God. God would thereby be identical
to something contingent, which is absurd (Grant (), –). Our claim,
however, is that in the alone world, God’s knowledge is wholly intrinsic. Grant’s
extrinsic strategy of locating (some of) God’s knowledge (relationally) outside
God, in other words, will not work in the alone world.
In order to get a handle on this issue, consider the following. For any (token or
type) feature F that S possesses, F is either wholly intrinsic to S, wholly extrinsic to
S, or intrinsic to S in some respects but extrinsic to S in others. After all, F either
characterizes S as it is in itself, or F doesn’t so characterize S. But if F doesn’t so
characterize S, then either F characterizes S only in relation to something else,
or F characterizes S partly as it is in itself and partly in relation to something
else. These exhaust logical space. And from this it follows that God’s knowledge
is either wholly intrinsic to God, wholly extrinsic to God, or intrinsic in some
respects but extrinsic in others.
Consider, next, that S’s having the (wholly or partly) extrinsic feature F presup-
poses that there is something outside S that serves as a (partial or complete)
grounding of S’s having F. This simply falls out of the meaning of extrinsic features:
they are features S has not solely in virtue of itself – in which case, there must be
something apart from S that accounts for S’s having them. Without something
outside S, there would be nothing to which S could relationally stand, and
hence there would be no extrinsic features that S could possess.
What follows from the preceding paragraphs is that F can be (i) wholly extrinsic
to S or (ii) intrinsic to S in some respects but extrinsic to S in others only if there is
something apart from S to which S could relationally stand. And from this it follows
that God’s knowledge can be (i) wholly extrinsic to God or (ii) intrinsic to God in
some respects but extrinsic to God in others only if there is something apart from
God to which God could relationally stand.
The aloneness argument against classical theism
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But if God exists alone, there is nothing apart from God to which God could rela-
tionally stand. Hence, if God exists alone, God’s knowledge can be neither wholly
extrinsic to God nor intrinsic to God in some respects but extrinsic to God in
others. It follows, then, that if God exists alone, then God’s knowledge is wholly
intrinsic. As we saw earlier, however, the classical theist is committed to the pos-
sibility that God exists alone. So, it’s possible that God’s knowledge is wholly
intrinsic.
The aloneness argument
At this point, the conflict among simplicity, omniscience, and creative
freedom arises. If (i) in every world God knows everything that exists, obtains,
and is true in that world, and (ii) in every world there are contingent truths, it
follows that in every world, God contingently has some knowledge. And (i)
follows from Divine Omniscience, and (ii) was established in the previous
section. So: necessarily, God contingently has some knowledge. And since
we’ve already found that it’s possible that God’s knowledge is wholly intrinsic, it
follows that it’s possible that God contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge.
Now, whatever is wholly intrinsic to S is either an essential feature of S or an
accident of S. But nothing God contingently has can be an essential feature of
God, for then God Himself would be contingent. So, it’s possible that God has
an accident. But if DDS is true, it’s impossible for God to have an accident. God
is necessarily simple, lacking in all parts (including accidents). So, DDS is false.
To put it formally:
. God’s knowledge is either wholly intrinsic to God, wholly extrinsic to
God, or intrinsic to God in some respects but extrinsic to God in
others.
. God’s knowledge is (i) wholly extrinsic to God or (ii) intrinsic to God in
some respects but extrinsic to God in others only if God doesn’t exist
alone.
. Possibly, God exists alone.
. So, possibly, God’s knowledge is wholly intrinsic. (–)
. Necessarily, God contingently has some knowledge.
. So, possibly, God contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge. (,)
. Whatever is wholly intrinsic to S is either an essential feature of S or an
accident of S.
. Nothing God contingently has can be an essential feature of God.
. So, possibly, God has an accident. (–)
. If DDS is true, it is not possible that God has an accident.
. So, DDS is false. (,)
In the following sections, we consider and rebut five objections to the argument.
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Flawed analysis of extrinsicality
Objection 1. Premise () is false because it presupposes a flawed analysis of in/
extrinsicality. The analysis underlying premise () holds that a necessary condition
for S’s having an extrinsic feature is the existence of something wholly apart from
(i.e. entirely outside of) S. But this is mistaken, since things can have extrinsic fea-
tures in worlds in which they exist alone.
Consider a world in which an electron is the only thing in existence (per impos-
sibile). In such a world, the electron has the property of ‘existing alone’. But surely
this is not an intrinsic property; it is an extrinsic property. An exact duplicate of
such an electron may very well lack the property (since the exact duplicate of
the electron may exist in a world with protons, say) – in which case it cannot be
intrinsic. The electron, in other words, can be deprived of the property without
changing anything about the electron itself – the electron can be deprived of the
property solely by changing things wholly other than (and entirely outside of)
the electron. But in that case, the property cannot be intrinsic to the electron.
This is the correct test of in/extrinsicality.
Notice, though, that the electron has this extrinsic property in a world in which
the electron exists alone. Thus, the analysis of extrinsicality upon which the
Aloneness Argument rests is false – it is not a necessary condition for S’s possessing
an extrinsic feature that there exist something wholly outside/other than S. Hence,
God’s contingent knowledge can still be extrinsic in the alone world.
Reply. There are three distinct replies to this objection, each of which we believe is
sufficient to avert the objection.
First, note that the proposed counter-example to our understanding of extrinsi-
cality is the property of ‘being alone’. But this property reports some absence, lack,
or failure of the subject. S’s property of ‘being alone’ reports of S that it fails to exist
alongside things outside of (i.e. wholly apart from) S. It reports the absence or lack
of non-S things that might co-obtain with S.
In general, other proposed counter-examples to our understanding of extrinsi-
cality likewise report some absence, lack, or failure of the subject. Humberstone
gives the example of the property ‘not being six meters away from any rhododen-
dron’ as another paradigm example (Humberstone (), ). These proposed
counter-examples are what Lewis (, ) calls negative extrinsic properties.
They are negative in that they report absences, lacks, or failures of their subjects.
Extrinsic properties that don’t report such absences, lacks, or failures of their sub-
jects are positive extrinsic properties. Instead of an absence or lack of a relation to
something else, positive extrinsic properties are actual relations to something
else.
But with this distinction in hand, we can see why Objection  does not succeed
in averting the Aloneness Argument. For God’s knowledge is not a negative prop-
erty/feature reporting some absence, failure, or lack of God’s. In regard to divine
The aloneness argument against classical theism
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knowledge, we are talking about some positive reality that God has or possesses.
God’s knowledge is not an absence, failure, or lack in God in the way that God
lacks arms (say) or lacks bad-making properties. Thus, while the objection
might show that not all properties of objects in worlds in which they exist alone
are intrinsic, it fails to make any headway in showing that God’s knowledge is
among such properties. Indeed, as we’ve seen, we have strong reason to reject
this.
Second, we think Objection  succumbs to a dilemma. Whatever item x we’re
talking about in a world in which God exists alone, x either has some existence/
reality/positive ontological status, or it doesn’t. If x does have some reality, then
x cannot be distinct from God, for then x would be created (as any non-God
item requires God to create it, under classical theism). But that is impossible,
since God doesn’t create anything in the alone world. So, x must be strictly
identical to God. But then x couldn’t contingently obtain, since God is not a
contingently obtaining item. On the flip side, if x doesn’t have any reality, then
anti-realism about x is true.
But now let x be divine knowledge. Classical theists cannot be anti-realists about
this, for that would amount to a denial of Divine Omniscience. So, this knowledge
has some reality. But if that’s the case, then (per our deduction in the previous
paragraph) it cannot obtain contingently. We deduced earlier that, in the alone
world, any item x with positive ontological status (i.e. with existence or reality)
couldn’t be contingent. Hence, there cannot be contingently obtaining divine
knowledge in the alone world. And that’s absurd, since (as we’ve seen) some of
God’s knowledge in such a world is merely contingent.
Here’s a third reply to Objection . Even granting Objection ’s test of intrinsi-
cality, it seems false to say that we could deprive God of knowledge without chan-
ging anything about God Himself (and instead solely by changing things wholly
apart from and outside of God).
For it seems that one can only know P if one has justification for believing that
P. Hence, God’s knowing that P entails that God has justification and belief.
Intuitively, though, beliefs – qua mental attitudes towards intentional objects
(e.g. propositions, facts, or whatever) – are such that depriving a conscious
subject of them will require changing something about that subject and not just
things wholly outside or apart from the subject.
Further, it seems plausible that S’s justificationmust at least partly consist in fea-
tures of the knowing subject that won’t differ solely by changing things wholly
outside S. For instance, surely it is partly constitutive of S’s having justification
that S is internally consciously aware of one or more reasons upon which S
bases S’s belief. It seems, then, that to deprive S of S’s justification, one would
have to alter the reasons or grounds upon which S bases S’s beliefs, alter S’s con-
scious awareness of such grounds, and so on – none of which seem to involve mere
alterations to things wholly outside of S. Thus, varying God’s knowledge entails
varying God’s justification, and varying God’s justification plausibly cannot be
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done solely by varying things wholly outside of God (i.e. things within the created
order).
Moreover, it seems that there’s no way to give a principled account of the differ-
ence between God’s believing a proposition and not believing it (or believing its
negation) without some difference within God (as opposed to mere differences
in created things wholly outside God). Consider one such proposition, P, which
is true in some worlds and false in others. God, then, believes the proposition in
some worlds but not in others. What accounts for this? What explains or
grounds God’s varying beliefs across these worlds?
One might be tempted to say that it’s God’s differing relations across worlds –
God’s standing in the believing relation in some worlds but not standing in this
relation in other worlds – that accounts for it. But there are two problems with
this. First, it doesn’t answer the problem but rather relocates it: for in virtue of
what does God stand in the believing relation in some worlds but not in others?
Without (say) an intrinsic mental attitude towards the propositions that varies
from world to world, it’s difficult to see what could account for God’s standing
in these varying relations. Second, this response fails to give a principled way to
delineate a belief relation from other relations to propositions in which God
stands. For God stands in a whole host of relations to every proposition (existing
in the same world as, believing the negation (or affirmation) of, and so on). In
virtue of what do some of these relations constitute belief relations while others
constitute belief-in-negation relations? The conception of belief as a mere ‘believ-
ing relation’ seems to make God’s standing in such relations entirely brute.
Grant () anticipates this grounding worry for an extrinsic model of divine
knowledge. He asks us to consider the following propositions:
P: Muggsy Bogues is the shortest player in NBA history.
Q: Spud Webb is the shortest player in NBA history. (Grant (), )
Grant then asks us to consider a person named Fred who is entertaining
these propositions. According to Grant, Fred’s act of believing is quite different
from God’s act of believing. As Grant understands the situation, Fred’s act of
believing requires a ground, whereas God’s does not. Why is a ground required
in Fred for his standing in the believing relation to P instead of Q? Grant responds:
Presumably, because we need something that accounts for Fred’s standing in this relation
when it is consistent with being Fred that he stand in the relation to Q instead . . . Nothing
about what Fred is essentially explains why he stands in the believing relation to the true
proposition P. So, granting that something must account for his standing in the relation, it
looks as if the ground will have to be some intrinsic, accidental property of Fred that he lacks in
worlds in which he does not stand in the believing relation to P. (ibid.)
Grant explains that, unlike Fred, it’s false that nothing about God’s essence
explains why he stands in such relations. ‘God’s very essence,’ writes Grant, ‘is
such that he believes whatever propositions are true in any given world. What
The aloneness argument against classical theism
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accounts for God’s standing in the believing relation to P is simply God’s essence
coupled with the fact that P is true’ (ibid., ).
Grant’s response here is unconvincing. The very question at issue is (at least in
part) how God could be essentially omniscient in the first place provided that (i)
there are propositions which are true in some worlds but not in others and (ii)
there is nothing (according to DDS) within God that varies across such worlds
(like differential awareness, differential mental attitudes, differential internalist
justification, and so on). Appealing to omniscience, then, subtly begs the question.
The grounding objection to this extrinsic model of God’s belief can be rightly
understood as an attack on the very notion of essential omniscience given DDS
and contingent knowledge. The question is how God could be essentially omnis-
cient in the first place without such intrinsic features that differ from world to
world. Grant’s solution, then, won’t do.
Here’s further reason to doubt that Objection ’s test of in/extrinsicality can
avert the Aloneness Argument. It seems plausible that (i) truths are such that
God desires to know them, and (ii) one cannot change S’s desires merely by alter-
ing things wholly outside of and apart from S. For desires seem to be essentially
mental inclinations or tendencies, and hence they seem to be features that one
could change only by changing the subject itself. And it’s plausible that God
desires to know truths, as possessing knowledge is intrinsically valuable.
Putting all of this together, we can see the following. Because contingent truths
vary from the alone world to a non-alone world, it follows by (i) that God’s desires
vary from the alone world to a non-alone world. And from (ii) in conjunction with
Objection ’s test of in/extrinsicality, it would follow that such desires are intrinsic
to God (since one cannot deprive God of them merely by altering things wholly
apart from/outside of God). Thus, (some of) God’s desires will be intrinsic to
God in the alone world but yet contingently obtaining. And this is just a desire
version of the Aloneness Argument. Hence, Objection  fails to avert the
Aloneness Argument on yet another score.
One might question at this juncture whether God has desires under classical
theism. However, it is a very standard theistic claim that God desires the good
and flourishing of human beings. Moreover, the notion that God has desires
and intentions is built into classical doctrines like creation, predestination, and
providence. As the classical theist Ron Highfield explains, ‘God’s act of creating
is not irrational or arbitrary but is accompanied by God’s intentions and is directed
toward an end’ (Highfield (), ). When it comes to planning and governing
the history of the world, classical theists like Aquinas often talk about God’s ante-
cedent and consequent will. God’s antecedent will is that all human beings be
saved, and that no sin shall occur, whereas God’s consequent will is that sin
occur, and not all are saved. Leigh Vicens and Simon Kittle point out that concepts
like antecedent will are better understood as divine desire because it describes
what God wants most in ideal situations.
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Some classical theists might retort that God has desires only analogously. But
our point only requires that God has desires, whether univocally or analogically.
For even if God has desires only analogously, he nevertheless desires to know
true propositions. And hence if the truth value of (certain) propositions genuinely
changes, God’s desires –whether analogical or univocal – change.
We’ve seen a number of plausible reasons why – even granting Objection ’s test
of in/extrinsicality –God’s knowledge (or God’s desire(s) ) will still count as intrin-
sic in the alone world. Hence, Objection  fails to secure extrinsic divine knowledge
in the alone world. Thus, it fails to avert contingent, intrinsic items of God in the
alone world – that is, it fails to avert the Aloneness Argument. This, in essence, is
our third reply to Objection .
We believe that these three replies (both individually and collectively)
adequately address Objection . Let’s turn, then, to Objection .
Restricted modal collapse
Objection 2. The classical theist can simply deny premise () – the claim that it is
possible that God exists alone – and simply accept ‘restricted modal collapse’:
necessarily, God creates, but there is no individual thing which is such that God
necessarily creates it. This strategy holds that it is necessary that God create some-
thing or other.
Reply. There are several problems with this strategy. To start, classical theists like
James Dolezal point out how the necessity of creation is incompatible with clas-
sical theism. According to Dolezal, a necessary creation is incompatible with
divine absoluteness. If the divine nature is such that God must create, then God
depends on the created world’s existence in order to be Himself (i.e. fully
actual). According to Dolezal, God would need something apart from God to be
God – in which case, God wouldn’t be absolute.
To further drive home the point that the necessity of creation is not a live option
for classical theism, recall that a central commitment of classical theism is the
affirmation of divine creative freedom and the Contingency of Creation.
Objection  aims to avoid the Aloneness Argument, then, by denying classical
theism. As a general rule of thumb, we do not advise defending classical theism
by way of denying classical theism.
But suppose one abandons classical theism in favour of (say) panentheism to
avoid the Aloneness Argument. This might be thought to help because panenthe-
ism affirms that God necessarily creates a universe of some sort, though God has
some degree of freedom as to which universe God brings about. Would this help
one maintain DDS? We say no for at least two reasons.
First, so long as (i) there’s at least one contingent thing, and (ii) intrinsic features
of S vary when S’s knowledge varies (for justification, see our reply to Objection ),
the existence of a single contingent thing is incompatible with the combination of
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DDS and omniscience. Even ignoring the applicability in this context of our reply
to Objection , however, problems abound for the necessity of creation response.
So, second, even in worlds wherein the non-God world has denizens, it will
nevertheless be the case that ontologically prior to God’s creative act (i.e. onto-
logically prior to the contingent world’s existence), God contingently had knowl-
edge. For instance, in that ontologically prior state, God knew that <in an
ontologically posterior state of reality, contingent object O exists>. In this onto-
logically prior state, there existed nothing apart from God, and hence there was
nothing (in such a state) to which God could (extrinsically) relationally stand.
Ontologically prior to creation, then, (i) God had contingent knowledge, but (ii)
such knowledge could not consist in extrinsic relations. And (as we’ve seen) that
means God has accidents, which contradicts DDS.
In concluding this section, we note that even if these replies to Objection  fail,
we have made a significant discovery: proponents of DDS ought to accept the
necessity of creation.
Relations to non-existent things
Objection 3. The Aloneness Argument assumes that God cannot stand in relations
to non-existent things. For if God can stand in relations to non-existent things, then
even if God exists alone, His contingent knowledge (or its contents) could consist
in extrinsic relations to non-existent contingent things. Premise () of the
Aloneness Argument, then, is false.
Reply. There are at least four problems with this objection.
First, as with Objection , even if this account is correct, it doesn’t seem to avoid
contingent intrinsic features of God that vary across worlds as God’s knowledge
varies – and hence it doesn’t sidestep the worry about God having accidents.
This is because the reasoning employed in Objection  (concerning beliefs, justifi-
cation, awareness, the grounding of belief relations, desires, and so on) in support
of this thesis (viz. the thesis that variations in God’s knowledge across worlds
involve some kind of variation within God) equally applies to Objection .
Second, it seems plausible that x can only have a property if x exists. In other
words, if x is precisely nothing, then x cannot possess any properties; x cannot
be anything unless it exists. How could a non-existent thing – i.e. nothing –
possess anything? But if x’s having F presupposes that x exists, then Objection
 fails, since the objection at hand presupposes that non-existent things have prop-
erties (e.g. the properties being the object of God’s knowledge, being within God’s
awareness, and so on).
Third, Objection  seems incompatible with DDS. For under the account in
question, (i) God knows non-existent things, but (ii) God does not cause non-exist-
ent things (for if God caused them, they would exist!). But if God’s knowledge and
causal activity were identical, then God’s knowing non-existent things would be
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equivalent to God’s causing non-existent things. If divine knowing is divine
causing, then God causes what he knows. But Objection  says that God knows
non-existent things without causing them. So, divine knowing is not divine
causing. It follows that God’s causal activity is not identical to God’s knowledge,
which is contrary to DDS.
Here is a fourth worry. If we allow non-existent things to function as explana-
tions (explanations of God’s contingent knowledge, per Objection ), then it
seems that cosmological (and other explanatory) arguments that demand explana-
tions of broad features of reality (change, contingency, etc.) won’t be able to con-
clude to God’s existence. For the explanation could easily be in terms of something
non-existent, it seems. Alternatively: we wouldn’t have a principled reason for
demanding an explanation in terms of an existent entity that wouldn’t also serve
as a reason to reject Objection .
In concluding this section, we note that even if these replies fail, we have never-
theless made an important discovery: proponents of classical theism ought to give
up some highly plausible principles concerning non-existent things. We suspect
that many proponents of classical theism would prefer to avoid such
commitments.
Content essentialism
Objection 4. The Aloneness Argument assumes content essentialism, which is the
view that the content of a belief or knowledge is an essential feature of that belief or
knowledge. For if content essentialism is false, then God can have one and the
same intrinsic state of knowledge across all possible worlds despite different con-
tents of that knowledge across worlds. So, premise () is false. It’s false that God
contingently has knowledge.
Reply. There are at least three problems with this objection.
First, as with Objection , even if this account is correct, it doesn’t seem to avoid
contingent intrinsic features of God – and hence it doesn’t sidestep the worry
about God having accidents. This is because even if God’s knowledge remains
the same despite differential contents of that knowledge, God will still (plausibly)
have differential justification, differential mental attitudes toward different
content, differential awareness of reasons and the relations between reasons
and what they justify, differential desires concerning such contents, and so on.
Second, a significant number of philosophers (including ourselves) find content
essentialism extremely plausible. Indeed, it’s difficult to see how the following two
conjuncts could both be true: (i) the object of knowledge is contingent, but (ii) the
knowing of that object isn’t contingent. For if the object is contingent, it follows
that there’s some world wherein that object doesn’t obtain. And if the object
doesn’t obtain, it follows that the subject’s knowing the object doesn’t obtain
(since knowledge of x presupposes x’s truth or obtaining). And if that’s right,
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then ‘the knowing of the object’ is contingent so long as the object known is con-
tingent. And again, this knowledge is either intrinsic, partly intrinsic and partly
extrinsic, or wholly extrinsic. But in the alone world, it could only be wholly intrin-
sic. An accident of God, then, is not avoided.
Third, Objection  doesn’t solve the problem but merely relocates it: for the
problem re-arises concerning the ontological status of the content of God’s knowl-
edge. In particular, this content is either wholly intrinsic, partly intrinsic and partly
extrinsic, or wholly extrinsic. But in the alone world, it cannot be the latter two, for
there is nothing apart from God in such a world that could serve as content.
Hence, the content is wholly intrinsic to God. But the content is contingent,
which is granted in Objection . So, God has an accident in the alone world.
Finally, even if all our replies fail, we have nevertheless made an important dis-
covery: proponents of classical theism ought to give up content essentialism. This
will be unpalatable for many.
Know thyself
Objection 5. What God knows is the very same thing in every possible world (He
knows Himself), and so there is no difference in God across worlds, including
the alone world. This is analogous to the Thomistic reply to the problem of cre-
ation: God wills the very same thing in every possible world (He wills His own
goodness), and so there is no difference in God across worlds, including the
alone world.
The classical theist can therefore reject premise (), the claim that, necessarily,
God has some contingent knowledge. On classical theism (so the objection goes),
God knows everything by knowing His own essence. So, there need not be any-
thing extrinsic to God in the alone world to which He relationally stands.
Nevertheless, He still knows contingent truths by essentially knowing His own
essence. This means there is no difference in God across worlds, including the
alone world.
Reply. This is a valuable objection. However, we are not convinced that it works.
We note at least three problems.
First, we note that Objection  is focusing on God in a world in which God exists
alone. The claim in Objection  is essentially saying that ‘God can know contingent
things by knowing His essence as imitable in various finite ways.’ But this response
won’t do. Within the classical theistic tradition, classical theists have long been
aware of the fact that God’s self-knowledge only gives God knowledge of all neces-
sary truths, including knowledge about what is possible. This is often referred to
as God’s natural knowledge because it is God’s knowledge of His own nature.
Natural knowledge does not give God knowledge of what is contingently the
case. God might know His essence as imitable, but that neither means nor
entails knowledge of the various ways God’s essence is actually imitated (or
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actually not imitated). The former can be gleaned from necessary truths concern-
ing what could possibly exist. But it’s precisely because the latter expressly con-
cerns contingent truths that knowledge of the former is categorically insufficient
for the latter.
Second, since God’s essence is utterly unchanging from world to world, it
follows that any knowledge solely based on God’s essence is unchanging from
world to world. But the contingency of the non-God world means that the non-
God world is not unchanging from world to world. And from this, it follows that
any knowledge of the non-God world is not unchanging from world to world.
Indeed, this is precisely why some contemporary classical theists have been
attracted to extrinsic models of divine knowledge. But, as we’ve seen, such
models won’t work for the alone world, since there is nothing extrinsic to or
outside of God in such a world.
Third, even if God knows all truths by or through knowing His own essence,
something is still contingent here –whether God’s knowledge, or the content of
God’s knowledge, or what have you. Pinpointing the means by which God contin-
gently knows things (by, say, knowing His essence) does nothing to resolve the
modal status of such contingent knowledge. Even if the story is true, it only tells
us how God got the knowledge. It doesn’t nullify or negate its contingency. So,
whether it’s the knowledge itself, or the content of the knowledge, or what have
you, the contingent item in question must be intrinsic to God, since there is
nothing extrinsic to or outside God in the alone world. So long as the thing in ques-
tion has some kind of positive ontological status in the alone world (which surely
we must accept if we are to avoid anti-realism about God’s knowledge, or the con-
tents thereof, or what have you), a contingent intrinsic item of God’s seems
unavoidable. And hence there is something intrinsic to God which is contingent.
And, as we’ve seen, this is not compatible with classical theism.
Conclusion
Classical theism faces a problem. The problem is that the following four
tenets seem to comprise an inconsistent tetrad: DDS, Divine Omniscience,
Divine Creative Freedom, and the Aloneness of God. As a tool for exploring this
inconsistency, we articulated and defended a novel argument called the
Aloneness Argument.
In summary form, the Aloneness Argument proceeds as follows. Under classical
theism, it’s possible that God exists without anything apart from Him. Any knowl-
edge God has in such a state would be wholly intrinsic. But there are contingent
truths in every world, including the alone world. So, it’s possible that God
(given His omniscience) contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge. But what-
ever is contingent and wholly intrinsic is an accident. So, God possibly has an acci-
dent. And that’s incompatible with DDS.
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Our hope is that the Aloneness Argument serves as a tool for fresh enquiry about
the nature of God and His relation to the created world.
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is an explicit commitment of classical theism. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our
attention.
. For a detailed analysis, see Garcia () and Frost ().
. Grant (), .
. Aquinas (), I. and I.; Rogers (), –.
. Grant ().
. Could we say God’s contingent knowledge consists in a failure of God to stand in an extrinsic relation to
something apart from Him? This won’t do. For a failure to stand in a relation is just a failure to possess a
feature – it’s an absence of a feature. But God’s knowledge is not a failure of God to possess something; it
isn’t an absence of a feature in God.
. We stress that not all of God’s contingent knowledge in the alone world is of negative existentials (where a
negative existential reports the non-existence of one or more things). There are also positive existentials
(i.e. non-negative existentials) God contingently knows. For instance: God contingently knows that God
freely and providentially chose to refrain from creating. In this case, the object of God’s knowledge is not
merely some lack or absence of something in reality (as would be the case of God’s contingent knowledge,
in the alone world, that (say) the Earth doesn’t exist). Instead, the object of God’s knowledge is God’s free,
providential choice.
. Could God be absolutely simple in the actual world but composite in other worlds? This is incoherent. For
then God would not be essentially simple. But then he would be accidentally simple. But that’s contra-
dictory: God would be accidentally simple, but (per His simplicity) wouldn’t have any accidents whatso-
ever. So, God would both have and not have accidents, which is absurd.
. One might object: Consider Smith, a human existing alone (per impossibile). Suppose Smith knows that ‘I
am alone’. Because Smith can be deprived of this knowledge by changing things wholly outside of Smith
(suppose that a virtual particle popped into existence), isn’t Smith’s knowledge that ‘I am alone’ extrinsic
in such a world? We reply: first, even if (some of) Smith’s knowledge in this world is (partly) extrinsic, the
extrinsicality consists in a relation Smith bears to some non-Smith thing, viz. the truth or fact that Smith
exists alone. Thus, this is not a counter-example to our claim in the paragraph (of the main text) under
consideration. (Moreover: unlike Smith, God stands in no relation to some non-God thing in the alone
world, since there is no non-God thing in the alone world.) Second, the Smith case is relevantly disanalogous
to God. For when we deprive Smith of knowledge in this case, we envisage a scenario in which Smithmerely
goes from knowing P to not knowing P. But this is crucially different from going from knowing P to knowing
not-P. The latter involves a kind of truth-tracking status which seems unintelligible apart from either a
change in the relation between the knowing subject and the fact that P or else some change in the knowing
subject’s intrinsic mental state (like differential awareness, differential justification, etc.).
. The proposed counter-example is helpful, though, since it clarifies that our understanding/analysis of in/
extrinsicality is restricted to positive features.
. Here’s one (perhaps clearer) way to think about it. God’s knowledge exists/obtains. But some such
knowledge is only contingently obtaining in the alone world. Hence, there is something with positive
reality in the alone world that is contingent. But this is not possible according to CT, since if it has some
positive reality or being but is contingent, then it would be created by God. But by definition, nothing is
created by God in the alone world.
. Recall that we have left open the intentional objects of divine knowledge, as different classical theists will
fill in the details here in different ways. For ease of exposition, we will henceforth use propositions as
stand-ins. But the arguments go through on other understandings of intentional objects as well.
. What about externalism, the thesis that factors external to the knowing subject can/do confer justification?
Well, we only need the claim that God’s justification consists (at least in part) in internal conscious
awareness of God’s reasons or grounds. And surely God is not unaware of the reasons or grounds for His
beliefs! One might also raise a potential counter-example here: babies and (many) animals surely have
knowledge despite not being consciously aware of one or more reasons upon which they base their beliefs.
Even if correct, however, this won’t help the classical theist, since such scenarios only arise with subjects
whose awareness is finite, limited, and imperfect (e.g. they are not self-conscious or fully rationally
developed). But God’s awareness is not finite, limited, or imperfect; he is perfectly self-conscious and
rational.
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. Here is a third response we shan’t pursue further: the classical theist tradition is explicit that God cannot
stand in any real (i.e. extramental or mind-independent) relations with anything distinct from God (Craig
(), –).
. Mawson (), .
. Vicens & Kittle (), .
. Dolezal (), .
. Oord, ).
. One might think that there is no such thing as a state of affairs ontologically prior to creation. But it seems
to follow upon the very notion of creation: that which brings something into being is ontologically prior to
that which is brought into being. Aquinas himself writes: ‘For all creatures before they existed, were
possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch
as God could produce them into existence’ (Summa Theologiae I, q, a). See also Summa Theologiae I,
q, a and Leftow (), .
. We can also see this as falling out of a Quinean meta-ontology: if it is the case that ∃x(Fx), then the value of
the bound variable, x, exists.
. This is analogous to discussions concerning presentism and truthmakers. Cf. Florio & Frigerio (), –
. One might think that things can be related to past and future things despite their non-existence. A
couple of notes: (i) a significant number of presentists adopt strategies that avoid relations to past and
future objects (either because past- or future-indexed propositions don’t require truthmakers, or because
they have presently (or timelessly) existing truthmakers, or what have you); and (ii) relations to past and
future things seems relevantly dissimilar to the case at hand, since in the case of relations to past and
future things, at least they did exist or will exist. By contrast, the non-existent things with which we’ve
concerned ourselves are always precisely nothing – they never did exist, they don’t exist, and they never
will exist. This seems to make standing in relations to them all the more mysterious.
. Content essentialism implies that ‘for any beliefs (or knowings) a and b, if a and b have different content,
they are not the same belief (or knowing), and if a belief (or knowing) has a content p, there is no world in
which the same belief (or knowing) exists without that content’ (Grant (), ).
. And if this is denied, the content essentialism objection reduces to Objection  concerning relations to
non-existent things.
. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this objection to our attention.
. For extensive discussion and defence of God’s natural and free knowledge, see Change to Mullins ().
. Molina (), –; Goris (), .
. For example, Pruss (), Brower (), Grant ().
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